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Send LDX to Sec. Rusk/from Walt Rostow

Herewith a supplementary message from Wakaizumi on Sato's proposed Ryukyus formula.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By J. Lynn, NARA, Date 1-1-91
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Prof. Kei Wakaizumi came to my house for dinner last night. He asked for ten minutes privately. He said that, having just gotten off a plane when he last talked to me, he wished to assure that his message was absolutely clear. Therefore, he had written it down, and he read it. That was the only business conducted.

The exact text follows.

"President and Prime Minister agreed that two governments, guided by the aim of the reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan at the earliest possible date should hold consultations through diplomatic channels on the status of these islands with the view to reach, within a few years, agreement on a date satisfactory to two governments for the reversion of these islands."

"1. Mr. Sato is very grateful to the Johnson administration for the favourable consideration to the early reversion of the Bonins. He is well aware of the difficult problems involved on your side. So, I don't think he has any objections to your reservations with regards to the Bonins' reversion to Japan.

"2. Unfortunately, however, the mounting popular enthusiasm, tremendous political pressures in Japan and needless to say in Okinawa for the early reversion of the administrative rights over the Ryukyus have grown up to such extent that even few Japanese evaluate the return of the Bonins as a great achievement. On the contrary, the great many people now fear that the return of the Bonins might be used as relief in exchange for the reversion of Okinawa, (where almost one million Japanese live).

"3. Under these circumstances, Mr. Sato now strongly feels that he is compelled to get, from President Johnson, some kind of indication of the timing or rather long-range prospects of the Ryukyus' reversion, however vague it may be.

"4. I am certain that at the same time, Mr. Sato understands and fully appreciates how difficult it must be for the President to accommodate Mr. Sato's needs of this nature at this moment. I You gave me the 3 reasons yesterday and they are all reasonable good reasons."
5. Nevertheless, Mr. Sato feels that, after all, as he is coming here to meet President Johnson for the summit conference, he cannot possibly go home without something more specific on the prospects of Okinawa. That's why he carefully devised that formula, to raise to President.

6. Of course, Mr. Sato/ his government as well as his Liberal Democratic Party, and /the majority of Japanese people/ do feel that the maintenance of the effective U.S. military basis (sic) there as long as they are needed and the reversion of the administrative rights to Japan, the both can be made fully compatible. And Mr. Sato is determined to see to that.

7. Based on his firm conviction of this basic principle, Mr. Sato is hoping, under the formula he wishes to propose to President Johnson directly, that an agreement might be reached on the mutually satisfactory date of the reversion before June 1970 (when US-Japan Mutual Security Pact comes to the ten years term: of course we are going to firmly maintain that Pact for many more years to come) (in communiqué).

8. From internal political point of view, as the Socialists and left-wingers are trying to make Okinawa the biggest political issue at that time to instigate anti-Pact and anti-American feeling, it is the best policy for us to set the date of the reversion of the Ryukyus by then.

9. The actual date of the reversion depends upon the three factors you mentioned to me yesterday. So, it may be 1975 or 78 or even 1980, we don't mind as long as we have some prospects of the reversion so that we could say to/Ryukyu people as well as Japanese "Wait until 1975, 78, 80, and in the meanwhile we have a lot to do to smooth the way for the actual reversion." Then, I am sure they will patient to wait, and cooperate with Americans to maintain the effective bases there.

10. By the time of June 1970, (Mr. Sato will be in office until November 1970) I should think we could have much clear idea and prospects of three factors
   a. Vietnam
   b. Communist China
   c. Japan's progress towards its responsibility in the field of security.

11. Finally, Mr. Sato feels that now President Johnson can alone make such a decision Mr. Sato so badly needs at home. In return, as I told you, he is determined to do everything possible to help the President in spite of certain political price he has to pay at home."
President and Prime Minister agreed that two governments, guided by the aim of the reversion of the Ryukyus at the earliest possible date, should hold consultations through diplomatic channels on the status of these islands with the view to reach, within a few years, agreement on a date satisfactory to two governments for the reversion of these islands.
1. Mr. Sato is very grateful to the Johnson administration for the favourable consideration to the early reversion of the Bonins. He is well aware of the difficult problems involved on your side. So, I don't think he has any objections to your reservations on the Bonins' reversion to Japan.

2. Unfortunately, however, the mounting pressures in Japan and needlessly to say in Okinawa for the early reversion of the Ryukyuans have grown up to such extent that, even few evaluate the return of the Bonins as a great achievement. On the contrary, the people fear that, the return of the Bonins might be used as relief in exchange for the reversion of Okinawa (where almost one million Japanese line.)
3. Under these circumstances, Mr. Sato now strongly feels that he is compelled to get, from President Johnson, some kind of indication of the timing or rather long-range prospects of the Ryukyus' reversion, however vague it may be.

(at the same time,)

4. I am certain that Mr. Sato understands and fully appreciate how difficult it must be for the President to accommodate Mr. Sato's needs of this nature at this moment. [You gave me the 3 reasons yesterday and they are all reasonable good reasons]

5. Nevertheless, Mr. Sato feels that, after all, as he is coming here to meet the President Johnson for the summit conference, he cannot go home without something on the prospects of Okinawa. That's why he carefully devised that formula, to raise to President...
Of course, Mr. Sato & his government as well as his Liberal Democratic Party, and [the majority of Japanese people] do feel that the maintenance of the effective U.S. military bases as long as they are needed and the reversion of the administrative rights can be made fully compatable. And Mr. Sato is determined to see to that. [USS Enterprise Nov. 2nd.]

Based on his conviction of this basic principle, Mr. Sato is hoping, under the formula he wishes to propose to President Johnson directly, that an agreement might be reached on the mutually satisfactory date of the reversion before June 1970. (When U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Pact comes to the ten years term). Of course we are going to firmly maintain that Pact for many more years to come)

[In communique]
7. From internal political point of view, as the Socialists & left-wingers are trying to make Okinawa the biggest issue at that time to instigate anti-Pact and anti-American feeling, it is the best policy for us to set the date of the reversion of Ryukyu by then.

8. The actual date of the reversion depends upon the three factors you mentioned to me yesterday. So, it may be 1975 or 78 or even 1980, we don't mind as long as we have some prospects of the reversion so that we could say it Ryukyu (as well as Japanese) people, "Wait until 1975, 78, 80, in the meanwhile we have a lot to do to smooth the way for the actual reversion." Then, I am sure they will patient to wait, and cooperate with Americans to maintain the effective bases there.
9. By the time of June 1970, I should think we could have much clearer ideas & prospects of three factors:

(a) Vietnam
(b) Communist China
(c) Japan's progress towards its responsibility in the field of security

10. Finally, Mr. Sato feels that now President Johnson can alone make such a decision. Mr. Sato so fully needs at home. In nature, as I told you, he is determined to do everything possible to help the President in spite of the political prices he has to pay at home.