

December 1, 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Feasibility of Concentrating U. S. Military Installations on Okinawa in a Single Area

REFERENCE: Memo for the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, same subject, dated November 19, 1959.

The President has this date accepted the conclusion that "the concentration of U. S. military facilities on Okinawa in a single area is neither feasible nor desirable", submitted by the Department of Defense in the reference memorandum prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 2034.

/s/ GORDON GRAY

GORDON GRAY
Special Assistant
to the President

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	MR 71-295, 42
By	TB NLE Date 8/25/98

November 25, 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GRAY

SUBJECT: Background information related to a study from the Secretary of Defense entitled, "Feasibility of Concentrating U.S. Military Installations in Okinawa in a Single Area"

1. The subject study originated in the NSC meeting held on January 15, 1959, in the light of a statement by the President during the Council's consideration of U.S. Military Bases Overseas. At this meeting, during a briefing by the Chairman, JCS, and the Secretary of State, in which the Okinawa base was discussed, the President agreed with the Secretaries of State and Defense that there was a need for a study on the feasibility of concentrating U.S. military installations in Okinawa in a single area. The responsibility for implementing the President's request was assigned to the Secretary of Defense. (See NSC Action 2034, c, (2), and NOTE,)

2. The subject of the Okinawa base arise again in the Council meeting held on April 23, 1959, when U. S. Military Bases Overseas was again considered. At this meeting, the Chairman, JCS, reported orally that the subject Study was being actively conducted by the Department of Defense. (See NSC Action 2070, b, (2).)

3. (The President may associate this request with another request, made by him at the same January 15, 1959 meeting, for a review of the importance of continued maintenance by the U.S. of the Sangley Point Naval Base in the Philippines. The review was made and at the request of the Secretary of Defense, General Twining subsequently reported to the President that the Sangley Point Naval Base was still considered militarily important.)

4. A briefing note is appended for your use when you meet with the President. That portion of it summarizing the study in paragraphs 2-3 is, I think, good, succinct language taken directly from Mr. Gates' covering memorandum. It might be desirable to read parts of the longer two-page summary, but I doubt it.

/s/ SAMUEL E. BELK
Samuel E. Belk

A Study from the Defense Department Entitled, "Feasibility of Concentrating U.S. Military Installations in Okinawa in a Single Area"

I think you will recall that in the Council's discussions of U.S. Military Bases Overseas, the idea of concentrating U.S. installations on Okinawa in a single area has several times been put forward. In the Council meeting last January 15th, you and the Secretaries of State and Defense agreed that a study should be made on the feasibility of such a plan. The Secretary of Defense was assigned the responsibility of making the study.

The necessary surveys have since been made and the Department of Defense has submitted a study entitled, "Feasibility of Concentrating U.S. Military Installations in Okinawa in a Single Area." The study concludes that such action would, from a military view point, involve an unacceptable degree of vulnerability for such a concentration. Additionally, it has been concluded that such action would resolve few existing problems of Okinawa, would increase the economic problems for the Ryukyuan Government, would require the expenditure of \$250 million by the U. S. Government and would not provide for minimum alternate base and staging facilities in the Far East in the event that the use of bases in Japan and the Philippines is restricted by those countries.

In the light of the foregoing, the Department of Defense considers that the concentration of U. S. military facilities on Okinawa in a single area is neither feasible nor desirable.

The Defense study recommends that greater efforts be made to guarantee U. S. security interests in the Ryukyus by showing greater interest as a nation in the development of the Ryukyuan people and the Ryukyuan economy.

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

November 12, 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Feasibility of Concentrating U.S. Military
Installations in Okinawa in a Single Area

REFERENCE: NSC Action 2034

Pursuant to NSC Action 2034, paragraph 1-C(2), the Department of Defense has completed a study, a summary of which is attached as Tab A, regarding the feasibility of concentrating U.S. military installations on Okinawa in a single area, and has concluded that such action would, from a military view point, involve an unacceptable degree of vulnerability for such a concentration. Additionally, it has been concluded that such action would resolve few existing problems on Okinawa, would increase the economic problems for the Ryukyuan Government, would require the expenditure of \$250 million by the U.S. Government and would not provide for minimum alternate base and staging facilities in the Far East in the event that the use of bases in Japan and the Philippines is restricted by those countries.

In the light of the foregoing, it is considered that the concentration of U. S. military facilities on Okinawa in a single area is neither feasible nor desirable.

/s/ THOMAS S. GATES
DEPUTY

Encl-1
Summary

DECLASSIFIED
Authority <u>DDO Directive 5200.30</u>
By <u>TB</u> NLE Date <u>2/25/98</u>

~~SECRET~~

1. Method of Study and Review Procedure

Inasmuch as the Department of the Army has been delegated the responsibility for the administration of the Ryukyu Islands by the Secretary of Defense and the staff responsibility for this administration is vested in the Civil Affairs Office of the Chief of Staff, the requirement for preparation of this study was placed upon the Department of the Army. The memorandum which advised the Secretary of the Army of this requirement also provided that the JCS would be afforded the opportunity to comment on the military and strategic considerations involved. The Department of the Army, in turn, passed the requirement to the Commander in Chief, Pacific, who designated his Representative in the Ryukyu Islands, who is also the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, to prepare the study coordinating with the service representatives in Okinawa. The completed study has now been forwarded to the Secretary of Defense through CINCPAC and the Department of the Army and has been commented upon the JCS.

2. Problem

To determine, in general terms, whether it is feasible to concentrate U. S. military installations on Okinawa in a single area during the period 1960-1964. Although the study is primarily concerned with the military aspects of the problem, with particular emphasis on construction feasibility, it also considers the political and administrative impact, and the security and vulnerability of the suggested enclave.

3. Principal Factors Considered

a. The location of existing facilities.

b. The operational requirements for:

(1) 2 airfields, with runways approximately 10,000 feet long, having a combined capacity to support the daily operation of approximately 250 aircraft.

(2) a military port with a monthly through-put capability of 40,000 measurement tons, a minimum depth of 44 feet berthing space to permit the mount out of a deviation, an isolated ammunition berth, and a bulk POL discharge facility.

(3) 2 sites for communications facilities, one for transmitting and one for receiving located at least 8 miles apart.

c. The physical requirement of the Services for:

(1) a source of fresh water under military control that will produce an average of at least 13 million gallons per day with ability to handle peak loads of 16 million gallons a day.

(2) a total area, exclusive of training areas and firing ranges, of approximately 45,000 acres.

d. The requirement of the Services for a friendly, native populace from which labor and services can be obtained.

e. The magnitude of funds required to construct the enclave.

4. Discussion

In addition to the foregoing factors, an analysis of construction feasibility, costs involved, the vulnerability and military utility of the resulting base, and the political, social, psychological and economic effects of such an undertaking on the Okinawan people was made. Consideration was given to the existing military installations on Okinawa which have been located, to the extent possible, on non-arable land and with a view toward bettering the situation of the Ryukyuan community. These existing installations and the various neighboring civil communities are so interspersed throughout Okinawa and are so interwoven with dual purpose and mutually complementing civil-military roads, power lines, water lines and communication cables that it is now impossible to classify the military complex on Okinawa as an enclave separate from the Okinawan community. Construction and other costs of relocation are estimated at about \$250 million.

Readjustment of existing U.S. forces installations on Okinawa into a single area would be accompanied by a marked economic, political and social upheaval through the island. Conditions resulting from such upheaval could readily contribute to deterioration of U.S. prestige. Release to the civil community of a significant part or all of the presently occupied installations would do little to mitigate the adverse effects resulting from such an action. Only a limited percentage of the land released would be arable, and it would generally revert to existing land owners rather than benefiting those persons moved.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

a. With the exception of certain missile sites, radar sites, and training areas, it is possible but not practical, from the standpoint both of military vulnerability and cost considerations, to concentrate all U. S. installations in either the Kadena or the Naha vicinity.

b. If this project were to be undertaken, the price that would be paid in terms of increased vulnerability, popular animosity, and monetary costs would be unacceptable as measured against the limited benefits which would be derived.

c. It is recommended that no further consideration be given to developing a military enclave on Okinawa but that greater efforts be made to guarantee U.S. security interests in the Ryukyus by showing greater interest as a nation in the development of the Ryukyuan people and the Ryukyuan economy.